

No. [handwritten: 06-101-197/95]

Tuzla, 20 August 1995

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I, HUSO SALIHOVIĆ, son of Šemso and Rahima, née Alić, born on 8 August 1963 in the village of Močevići³ [sic] in Srebrenica municipality, finished engineering and technical school in Bratunac in 1982, by occupation was a warehouse worker in Zeleni Jadar chair factory, was married to Ramzija Hasanović who died in 1992, has three sons, lives with his mother, his father died in 1977, has two brothers and two sisters who are married, does not know whether one of his brothers managed to break through from Srebrenica, before the war since 1988 he lived in Skelani in Srebrenica municipality until the combat operations commenced, currently he lives as an exile in G. Jasenica⁴ in Srebrenik municipality, member of ARBiH⁵ 18 April 1992, currently deployed in the 9th Muslim Brigade, on 19 and 20 August 1995, at the request of the 2nd Corps OB⁶, give the following:

S T A T E M E N T

When I noticed, at the beginning of April 1992, that war was inevitable, I immediately linked up with the SDA⁷ activists and as early as 14 April 1992 I left Skelani with my family and went to my birthplace of Močevići [sic]. At the beginning, village guards were organised, and around 25 April 1995 we formed a Crisis Staff in the village consisting of 5 people, and I was its President. Immediately after that, we formed in the village one unit of 40 men armed with hunting rifles and we had two automatic rifles. Then the refugees from the villages in Podrinje such as Voljevica, Pegare, Zapolje, and so on, started arriving, and those same refugees brought some weapons with them. Besides being in charge of the Crisis Staff, I was also the Commander of that unit. We immediately organised guards and the link-up with the neighbouring village of Zapolje. We engaged all able-bodied young men in the defence. Around 29 May 1992, the

¹ Translator's note: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

² t/n: Ministry of the Interior

³ t/n: Močevići

⁴ t/n: Gornja Jasenica

⁵ t/n: Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

⁶ t/n: Security Organ

⁷ t/n: Party of Democratic Action

unit from my village and a unit from Brezovice, approximately about 100 fighters, organised an attack on the Chetnik⁸ stronghold of the village of Oparci, in order to capture the strategic position for further defence from Chetnik invasion. It should be noted that before that, i.e. on 19 May 1992 in the village of Brezovice, we held a meeting of all commanders of units from neighbouring villages of Močevići [sic], Brezovice, Zapolje, Piriči⁹ [sic], Sase, and Podložnik, in which we among us chose Senahid Tabaković (reserve Captain) to be the Commandant of that area.

In that operation against the Chetnik village of Oparci that we carried out on 29 May 1992, we captured some weapons, killed 2 and captured 3 Chetniks whom we handed over to Srebrenica. Such organisation of units and guards remained until September 1992 when an Order of the War Staff from Srebrenica arrived and companies and battalions were to be formed. In my village a company was formed, as well as in other listed villages, i.e. in larger villages companies were formed and in smaller ones platoon were formed. Those units made up a battalion and its Commandant was Senahid Tabaković. Immediately after seizing the village of Oparci, on 2 June 1992, the Chetniks carried out a strong counter-strike against our lines and the attack was successfully repelled. In close proximity of our area stood the Serb village of Ratkovići, birthplace of the famous Chetnik leader Milenko Živanović, present Commandant of the Podrinje Corps. After our success in Oparci, on 14 June 1992, the Chetniks started shelling our villages and panic broke out among our people given that it was the first time they experienced shelling, and there was danger of all the people withdrawing to Srebrenica and accordingly a larger [area] of the free territory falling. On my own initiative I went to Srebrenica to see Hakiya Meholjić and to request assistance, primarily in form of weapons and ammunition. He then told me that he could not help me, that he did not care because his house had burned down too, and that I should see Naser Orić and see if he could help me in any way. I immediately went to

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[illegible] and requested [illegible] anyway bragged that he had liberated [illegible] was assisting the upper part of Srebrenica, and that he should go down with [illegible] territory of Srebrenica with Konjević Polje. When I saw that the two of them were not going to help me, I went to see Akif Ustić who was hospitalised in the hospital in Stari

⁸ t/n: derogatory term for Serbs - member of Yugoslav royalist and Serbian nationalist movement in World War II in Yugoslavia

⁹ t/n: Pirići

Grad since he was wounded. At that time, Akif had about 20 capable fighters. I presented Akif with the alarming situation in my area, and he promised me that a week from then, when he recovered, he would come to help. Upon returning to my territory, I made the decision - which I presented to my Commandant Tabaković and he accepted it - to call for a meeting of all unit Commanders from the wider area towards which we gravitated. The meeting was held the next day in the village of Šubin, and in it I presented the then difficult situation and proposed for us to shift from defensive to offensive, i.e. to select 10-15 best fighters from each village who would constantly be in state of readiness to go and aid each other. Also, we agreed to carry out an attack at the village of Ratkovići. The attack was to happen three days later, but the developments on other lines delayed that operation by 7 days. In 7 days, we carried out the attack and conquered the villages of Ratkovići, Polinci, Dvorišta, Račići, and Dučići without losses. We had significant war booty in terms of weapons, livestock, and food, and that is how the liberation of the territory all the way to the Drina [river] commenced, and the Chetniks no longer carried out offensive operations in these areas until the famous offensive, i.e. until the demilitarisation of Srebrenica. During our famous offensive on Skelani which took place on 16 January 1993, my Commandant Senahid Tabaković was wounded and he could no longer perform the duty of Battalion Commandant. Naser Orić proposed to appoint Rešid Dervišević to that post, but when Zulfo Tursunović and Ramiz Bećirović came to the field and saw that both the command staff and the army wanted me to take that post, the two of them appointed me the Commandant of Skenderović Battalion, and Rešid Dervišević was my deputy.

During the intense enemy offensive in March 1993, my unit was repelling the intense attacks and it ended up in an unenviable position for further defence, i.e. it found itself in a shape of a narrow horseshoe. Every three days, I went to see Naser in the Command and requested assistance, to which Naser promised that he would organise the counter-attack from Dokovi in order for my positions to stabilise themselves, given that we - my unit from the village together with the people - were in danger of remaining encircled. A few days later, Naser organised the promised operation, but before the very beginning of the operation there was a quarrel between the Commandant of the 3rd May Brigade, Nedžad Bektić, and the Commandant of the Potočari Brigade, Ibrahim Mandžić, known as Mrki. They returned with their units to initial positions and we took action with our own forces and pushed the Chetniks from Skenderovići to the OŠ¹⁰ on Brežani. That is one of the examples of indiscipline of the command staff, and at the time Naser had remained in Srebrenica. That same night I went to Naser and Zulfo and told that the aforementioned brigades had returned, and I told them about our successes and requested for more assistance given that I felt that

¹⁰ t/n: Primary School

the Chetniks were destabilised and that they could be pushed further away. He promised me assistance, but that never happened. After that, there came a strong Chetnik counter-attack in which I was wounded and transferred to the hospital in Srebrenica. The Chetniks broke through our l/os¹¹ and the larger part of our territory fell into the Chetniks' hands. In my village of Močevići [sic], strong resistance was offered during which, among others, one Chetnik Major was killed on whom a plan for capturing Srebrenica was found. I, as wounded as I was, left hospital on the fourth day and went to Naser's staff and there I found Naser's deputy at the time, Zulfo, and I requested for something to be organised in order for Srebrenica not to fall and [I told him] that in that part of Skenderovići, Ljubisavići, Bukova Glava, and so on, Chetniks were advancing towards Srebrenica. That is when Zulfo told me that Naser had lost control over the command since he came back from Konjević Polje, and that he suddenly started drinking and whoring around, and he suggested to me that we go to the President of the Municipal IO¹² Hajrudin Fejzić [and] Hajrudin Avdić. In the Municipal Building, we only found Fejzić and we went with him to the Domavija Hotel to see Hakiya Meholjić, and we found [Dr] Nedret there with him. There I, Zulfo, Fejzić, Meholjić, and Dr Nedret talked about something [that could be] done for the defence of Srebrenica, and there was a lot of criticism of Naser due to his negligence. From there we all went to see Naser in his flat. We found "Naserovci"¹³ - [his] followers - there and they were all carrying backpacks, packed and ready to, and the music was blasting as loud as possible. While going from the hotel to Naser's flat, we heard from the neighbours that they were

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preparing to flee. Of all of us who came there, neither one of us dared [say] anything bad to Naser or criticise the things that we had criticised just a little before that in the hotel. We had a discussion there on how we could gather as many men and fighters as possible and stop the Chetnik breakthrough. We agreed that the operation would be carried out next morning immediately. However, only fighters from my battalion, 91 of them, came at the time and place agreed, so we returned as well. Immediately the next day everything was going as we agreed, the operation was commenced, and the Chetniks were attacked on all their newly-achieved lines and the Chetnik breakthrough was stopped, and in some places [their forces were] pushed away. The very next day, news arrived about the UNPROFOR

¹¹ t/n: line of defence

¹² t/n: Executive Committee

¹³ t/n: Naserovac (pl. Naserovci) - *Naser's men or Naser's lads*

being on its way there and Srebrenica being [declared] a demilitarised zone, thus all b/ds¹⁴ from both sides were stopped. **02966937**

Us, unit commandants, received an Order from Naser to surrender about 10% of our worst weapons to UNPROFOR, which we did. During the demilitarisation of Srebrenica, one part of the free territory remained not demilitarised, and that was the area of Jasenovo, Ljljen [sic] Do¹⁵, Ljeskovik, and Kotljevac, that was linked to the Perućac lake. In order for the defence of that area to be organised, we received an Order from the Commandant and the Chief of Staff for each battalion to form an active platoon consisting up to 40 fighters, which was to be engaged in that area. That area was also linking Srebrenica and Žepa. Guards and patrols were formed out of those platoons and they, in my opinion, did not execute their tasks well and after 1.5 month I was given a verbal order for my men, as well as others, by the Chief of Staff, Ramiz Bećirović, [to forward] stating that the patrols and guards were to be abolished in that area. I was against that but things happened in accordance with their request. I then requested to be relieved of my command as the Battalion Commandant since I could not make peace with such a large free area being handed over to the Chetniks without a single bullet shot, especially since that area was being used for trips to Žepa for getting food, and to have it unprotected even though we had a large number of soldiers who were not engaged somewhere.¹⁶ Later, a lot of our people died in that area in Chetnik ambushes. However, Commandant Naser and Chief of Staff Ramiz did not allow me to be relieved of command.

During the demilitarisation of Srebrenica, humanitarian aid in the form of food, clothes, footwear, and medications also started arriving. That aid was brought in by the UNHCR and all of it was handed over to the municipal bodies and was stored in the storage rooms of the Department Store. The municipal services took full care of the distribution of that aid, and Aziz Mekić was in charge for that as the storage manager. From what I know, of the total of the aid that arrived, about 20% was separated for the continuous food for the soldiers, and that amount of food was moved from the Department Store to the Staff storage room which was in a smaller building attached to the Court building. Since the army was not engaged in any operations at that time, there were no military kitchens but instead some of it was distributed to the soldiers, and a good part of it was sold for Naser and the closest circle of his collaborators. Furthermore, Naser could allocate on a small piece of paper unlimited quantities of humanitarian goods from the storage room in the Department Store to some individual as he wanted. So on one occasion, in June 1993, I heard that Naser had given a small

¹⁴ t/n: combat operation

¹⁵ t/: Ljljen Do

¹⁶ t/n: the last part of the sentence is unfinished in the original text

piece of paper on which he allocated Bajazit, called Basko, from Sase the quantity of 600 kg of flour and 24 kg of powdered juice. Given that there was famine at the time and that precisely during that period I personally asked Naser to give me some food for my 611 fighters, to which he said that he did not have it.¹⁷ I could not believe those rumours and I personally went to the storage room in the Department Store and checked that with Aziz Mekić and Sead Delić and saw for myself that the rumours were true. As upset as I was, I immediately went straight to Naser and told him, "I asked you to give me flour from my battalion, and you said that there was none, and yet you gave 6 meters [of it] to Basko." He responded that someone had told him that Basko had some kind of an intervention platoon. That is when I told him that he knew very well, as did I did, that Basko was not even in the army, given that he was from my area. And from that moment on, the relationship between Naser and I got worse. I myself was told by Ahmo Tihić - as a matter of fact, one wealthy man - that he had talked to Bajazit, called Basko, on multiple occasions and that Basko confessed to him that he was selling the humanitarian goods for Naser in replacement for marks and gold. Also, I will state the example which happened on 3 May 1993 when "Naserovci" Ćelo, Barak, Bekir, and others took all the private property away from people at the market, and I saw that personally, and I went with Fahrudin Alić, former police officer, to see Naser and tell him what his men were doing and to tell him that it was not good, and that in that manner both the army and he personally were losing their reputation. He then told me that he would look into it, and that it would not happen again, but [illegible] kept happening.

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[illegible] told by Rifet Husić from Voljevica, who had crossed over to the free territory before and is certainly alive, that out of the first humanitarian convoy Naser Orić had separated 3 tons of flour that was sold for him by Esnaf and Mujo Manžić from Dugo Polje. Mujo Mandžić is the brother of brigade commandants Smajo and Ibrahim Mandžić. I think that Rifet Husić could tell you a lot of things about the smuggling.

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Besides him, the famous smuggler Bego, known as Austrija, from Bileća in Bratunac municipality, also knows a lot. The entire time of the war he smuggled large amounts of goods. I heard that he got to the free territory and that he reached Zagreb and was then returned. I know three people with nicknames Boki from Voljevica, Ćelo from Konjević Polje, and Šanja from Drinjača worked for Naser and Miš and they mainly stole fuel from the UNPROFOR.

¹⁷ t/n: the last part of the sentence is unfinished in the original text

I heard countless times from Zulfo Tursunović, in the presence of Ibro Dudić, the Commandant of the 282nd Brigade, that some woman and some Gypsy man from Potočari were buying larger quantities of goods from the Chetniks for Naser Orić and Ibrahim Mandžić, the Commandant of the 280th Brigade. It was precisely Zulfo who mentioned the detail that on one occasion they had bought 10,000 razors for DM¹⁸ 3,000, and in Srebrenica they then sold 1 razor for DM 1.

Mid-February 1995, in a conversation with a security officer of the 28th dKov¹⁹, Nedžad Bektić, I saw that he knew a lot about the trade with the Chetniks, given that he had worked a lot on those cases, which he also confessed to me, and he told me that for his own safety he could not bring it to an end.

[?"Čude"], a former active police officer from Bratunac, who had broken through to Žepa and I think he will arrive to the free territory, told me about how some Naser's men had been supposed to sell the Chetniks a luxury Mercedes that has been the property of Ibrahim Golub from Potočari, and which was usurped by Naser. He said the price was DM 15,000 and the Chetniks were allegedly offering him DM 10,000, so they did not manage to sell it, but it could be seen from that they had contact and collaboration with the Chetniks.

As for the military organising after the demilitarisation, it remained the same up until September 1993 when one delegation, in which Nedžad Bektić represented the Army, went to Sarajevo. When he returned, he gave the instructions for further organising of the Army, and for the 8th OG²⁰ to be formed at the latest by 1 January 1994, and for the brigades to be formed in accordance with the designated formations. Alongside the existing 4 brigades, another two brigades were formed from existing individual battalions. That is how my Skenderovići [Battalion], as well as the battalions of Biljeg and Voljevica, and one company of the Srebrenica battalion, formed the 283rd Brigade. I, as the Commandant of my battalion, was respected in the Main Staff of Srebrenica, as well as by Commandant Naser, NŠ²¹ Bećirović, Zulfo, and others, given that I had contributed a lot to the liberation and the defence of the wider area of Srebrenica. The only thing they held against me was that I was indicating to murky businesses. However, at that moment, my leadership ability prevailed and on 1 January 1994 I was appointed the Commandant of the 283rd Brigade. Right before I was to be appointed the Commandant of the brigade, I was called for a conversation by the OG PK²² for morale, Nijaz Mašić, so he would tell me what were my weaknesses, them being the frequent criticising of and pointing to murky businesses of both Naser and others. He then told me, "You are a good and capable Commandant, [do] not point those

¹⁸ t/n: Deutsche Mark – a currency

¹⁹ t/n: *Army Division or Land Forces Division*

²⁰ t/n: *Operations Group*

²¹ t/n: *Chief of Staff*

²² t/n: *Assistant Commandant*

things out. There are machinations everywhere and, besides, not everything is as the people say it is." He warned me not to spend time with the people from the SDA, particularly with the MP Ibran Mustafić, the President of the SDA Hamed Efendić, and the pre-war Chief of MUP Hamed Salihović. It was particularly difficult for me to be told those things by a man who was insulting and belittling President Izetbegović and attacking the SDA in every corner, so on one occasion in a meeting of all the commandants and the Command of the OG, when the officer for morale Nijaz Mašić was supposed to give the political lesson, I stood up and told Commandant Naser, in Mašić's presence, that he was not adequate for giving the political lesson because he had been insulting and belittling President Izetbegović in every corner. Mašić defended himself by saying that it was not true. However, I stated with arguments where, what, and before whom he had said the things, and I also submitted a report in writing to Naser about that.

I was lucky that when the command of my brigade was formed I got the best men for my command, both literate and honest, capable and proven fighters. In our brigade we had order and discipline, we organised the record of weapons and equipment, created a plan for the training of fighters and officer staff, while in [illegible] units

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there was none of that, and instead there was general negligence. In the [?Command] of our brigade we had working hours, while the other units did not have that, not even the OG, but instead a few people would come to the Command of OG, stay there for an hour or two, eat there, and then leave. Commandant Naser would come [there] maybe once a week, sign some documents, and leave. He spent a lot of time at various parties and he dealt with politics, i.e. appointing his people [to posts] in municipal structures. I had discipline and I started punishing the fighters who did not go to guard duty or who left the demilitarised zone. However, those actions of mine were met with obstructions by the Commandant Naser himself; it simply bothered them that we do things that way, because people started talking openly about how we were better even than the OG. For example, fighters from other units do not go to guard duty or they sell their weapons and no one is held accountable for it. That is why I had problems with my fighters who were objecting that disciplinary measures were only being taken within our brigade, while in others no one was held accountable for anything. Pursuant to the Order by the Commandant of the 8th OG, we were obligated to have all brigades store all of their weapons, which we did to about 95%, while in other brigades that was poorly implemented, and some of them did not even try to do it. In October

1994, Commandant Naser allowed a civilian, Amir Harbaš from Dajljegošta, to take an M-53 PM²³ from our storage room without any explanation or a written order. I requested from Amir to return it to which he said that Naser authorised him to take it. I ran into Commandant Naser in the street and asked him what had he done, "How can he give weapons from a brigade to a civilian," to which he responded, "Why are you concerned about it, I know about it." Since I could not make peace with such things, I made a report in writing in which I stated that the Commandant was constantly working on disrupting the homogeneity within my brigade and I had reason to do that because even prior to that, without my consent, he had allowed certain persons from my brigade to transfer with their weapons to some other units. Those were mainly persons who did not agree with the discipline within the brigade.

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The very next day, I learned that a text with a request for my discharge was compiled in the Command of the OG which was sent to the Command of the 2nd K²⁴. It should be noted that I never officially received a reproof, reprimand, or any other sort of disciplinary measure from the superior command. A few days later, at a regular referral of the Commandants to the OG, I asked to speak and told them that they had written bad things about me and stated things that were not true in order to submit a request for my discharge and that it would have been fair if they had told me what had I done wrong except that I was fighting crime. Naser ended the meeting without a comment and asked me to come to his office. I then told him that he knew well, as did I, that those things were not true and that I could write a lot of things about him and send it, and then I mentioned him murders, smuggling, and so on, and to that he responded that I was only good at talking a lot and that I had the right to complain.

After that, I wrote two letters, one for President Izetbegović and the other one for General Rasim Delić in which I inexhaustibly wrote about that was happening in Srebrenica, how the military and civilian authority was acting, [and] I mentioned hiding of the money that arrived from the state, and stated that murders and other murky businesses were taking place. With the contents of the letter I acquainted Fahrudin Alić, who was at the time performing the duty of OG PK for Command Post. Since I was unable to send the letters to Sarajevo, we intentionally staged for the letters to fall in Naser Orić's hands, so he would know that we knew everything. When Naser got those letters he alarmed the Municipality in panic and the very next day they immediately called for a Municipal Council to which came the MPs who supported Naser and his followers. After that they submitted a KP²⁵ against me for insulting Commandant Naser. I personally asked Naser why he had not invited me to the meeting to

²³ t/n: machine gun

²⁴ t/n: Corps

²⁵ t/n: criminal charge

explain all the statements and to see who would dare say that they were untrue, and to have that go on the record then.

On 9 February 1995, Naser and his Chief called for a meeting with the command staff of my brigade, without my knowledge, and the topic was supposedly the reorganisation of the units. I arrived before the very meeting, and found out about that meeting, and I joined it. However, they immediately started talking against me and they had already prior to that arranged for a few company commanders from my brigade to confirm their allegations. However, the others who were present - and in the meanwhile a lot of the army joined the meeting - supported me and openly and publically attacked Naser by telling him that he was a thief. Naser left that meeting, and I heard that he cried on the way. On 13 February 1995, right when the reorganisation was happening, a consensus came from the Command of the 2nd K for my [illegible], thus I was replaced on 18 February 1995, and the handover was [?conducted on] 20 February 1995.

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The newly-appointed Commandant Smajo Mandžić was not present at the handover of the brigade, but instead the brigade was taken over by Hazim Džananović who was the Chief of Staff until then, and he was to supposedly hand the brigade over to the new Commandant later, given that the new Commandant did not want to be present so he would not be booed by the army.

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It should be noted that there were indications that my liquidation had been prepared on multiple occasions. One of such [occasions] was before my replacement, when Naser ordered me to go with my men to move the line 300 m forward in the Table sector. I found that suspicious and I did not go, but instead I sent an operative worker, and that same day Nijaz Salihović, who had been working in the woods, told me that he had seen some "Naserovci" in front of the line where I was supposed to go. That same day, after I returned from the field, I took a written statement of my operative worker regarding the circumstances surrounding that event, since Naser had gone with him and he asked the operative worker Ševal Smajlović why the Commandant had not gone [there], [and] whether [I] was afraid that [he] would kill [me]. The operative worker said in his statement that the entire time Naser was maintaining communication with some persons via Motorola. I asked him whether he was maintaining the communication with the Chetniks, and he said no, which means that he was communicating with his men who were in front of the line. Naser found out that same day that I had taken a written statement from the operative worker who then came to me the following day and kept justifying himself saying he did not know whom he had maintained communication with, and he was visibly frightened.

As for the behaviour of other officer staff in Srebrenica, I wish to state the following:

I heard that NEDŽAD BEKTIĆ, security officer in the dKov, used to sell wheat in Žepa with Meho from Osat during the time that Nedžad was the Commandant of the 3rd May Brigade, which was in 1992 and 1993. The wheat was war booty, and a part [of it came] from the people who gave it for the army. I have heard that numerous times from Hakiya Meholjić and Velid Delić from Srebrenica, as well as the fact that the quantities in question were larger quantities, and at that time the value of wheat was DM 2,000 per 100 kg. At that time when people were coming from Žepa to get food, in the villages of Srebrenica, Nedžad and his police took away rifles and guns from those people and later sold those same weapons in Žepa. I know that the PK for Security in the 282nd Brigade, Smajlović Suad who was known as Šošon, upon returning from Žepa acquainted Commandant Naser and NŠ Ramiz, in the presence of Fahrudin Alić, with the fact that in 1993 Nedžad Bektić sold an M-84 PM in Žepa before he got married. The entire Srebrenica knows about that [M-]84, and people were openly saying it to his face in official meetings. Furthermore, when people protested in front of the Municipal building at the beginning of May 1993 due to the injustice surrounding the distribution of the humanitarian aid, and when the people broke into the Municipal premises, I noticed among the people one man whose nickname was Bilal from Konjević Polje and who was representing the people when negotiating with the municipal officials. Also, there was talk of how that man knew something about the 108 kg of tobacco which arrived by a helicopter at the beginning of 1993 but was not distributed to the army. At that time, a kilogram of tobacco cost up to DM 2,000. The same night that the protest happened, that Bilal was liquidated and his body was found on Klisa. I was told by Ahmo Tihić and Džemo Tihić that they had heard that Azem Bektić had done it, most likely on the order of Nedžad Bektić, because from that moment on Nedžad Bektić and Naser became inseparable despite the fact that their relationship was bad before that; even Nedžad was threatened that he would be liquidated by Naser. After that, Nedžad became the security officer²⁶ in the Staff, and Nedžad later appointed Azem as the security officer in the 282nd Brigade.

As for the murder of Murif²⁷ [sic] Rizvanović, I was up in the village at the time so I do not know exactly how it happened; I just later heard the story in Srebrenica that he was killed by Bekir, known as Barak, from Usmulići²⁸ [sic] in Srebrenica municipality. At the beginning, that man was in Zulfo's military police, and later he was a so-called Naserovac in a mountain battalion. I was told by Begić Bego, known as Hajro, from Srebrenica, that some cousin of his from Sućeska had been bragging that he was wearing Nurif Rizvanović's

²⁶ t/n: this most likely refers to Head of Security

²⁷ t/n: Nurif

²⁸ t/n: Pusmulići

boots. Also, in connection to Nurif Rizvanović's murder, I can say that there is one woman who asked to talk to me on multiple occasions but we never had the chance, and her name is Abida Omerović from Sikirići in Bratunac municipality. Her daughter was going out with Rizvanović, and her other daughter was married to Muhamed Čikarić. Naser and Ramiz requested that Abida signed a statement saying that her daughter had been killed, so that they would give her help, and they also offered her a job, but she refused to do it.

As for Zulfo Tursunović, I am not familiar with his criminal

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actions, but I do know that Zulfo was often in quarrel with Naser and mainly [illegible] for appointing Municipal officials because they were both striving to appoint as many of their own people as possible. Zulfo often criticised Naser in front of me because of his criminal actions.

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Hakija Meholjić told me that there are a lot of registered charges in the MUP [submitted] by parents [claiming] that Naser and his men raped or forcibly took away girls. Fahrudin Alić told me about how a girl, [daughter] of his brother-in-law²⁹, whose name is Behara, from Voljevica complained to him of how Naser forcibly took her away, drove her in his car, and then raped her in his car in some location.

As for Mandžić Ibrahim, known as Mrki Mandža, the Commandant of the 280th Brigade, I know for a fact that Osman Imširević from Rulovci in Srebrenica municipality used to sell the humanitarian aid goods for him, which was also discovered by the MUP in February 1995, and I was told that by police officer Edhem Hasanović. After that, Edhem Hasanović was expelled from the MUP, and he was expelled by Chief Hakija Meholjić at Naser Orić's insistence. In his discharge decision, it was stated that he was being expelled due to the fact that he was [spending time] with people from the party and for unauthorised revealing of crime.

It was openly spoken in Srebrenica of how Naser Orić and Fahrudin Salihović, known as Adem, the Municipal Mayor, broke into a safe at the 11 Maj factory in Potočari from which they took gold and silver, and in Srebrenica gold was being bought off from people for Naser. I did not know anything about the political turmoil in Srebrenica until I came down to Srebrenica myself, and that happened when I was wounded, i.e. when it was demilitarised. I also heard stories of how the pre-war team did not organise the people for the defence well, and that the MP Ibran, the SDA President Hamed Efendić, and the

²⁹ t/n: husband of his wife's sister

Chief of MUP Hamed Salihović fled at the beginning of the war. Thanks to the stories I heard, I felt disgust for those people, but when I saw what the new team was doing and how they were belittling the legal RBiH authority and President Izetbegović, I started doubting those stories and felt the desire to talk to the former authority leaders. The pre-war role of the MUP should be emphasised because all the stations before the very beginning of war operations were moved around the MZ³⁰ and not a single rifle was handed over to the Chetniks, and that is to the former Chief of MUP Hamed Salihović's credit. As for those details, you can get much more information from the police officer Hasan Mustafić who came together with me from Žepa.

At the end of 1993, I spoke to Ibran, and later also to Hamed Salihović and Hamed Efendić. Through the conversation, I came to the conclusion that they were people loyal to President Izetbegović and the legal authority of the RBiH. The newly-appointed team banned any sort of political work in Srebrenica, and often during their public appearances they offended the legal authority of the RBiH as well as the SDA. That is how on one occasion, the Municipal President Osman Suljić, around April or May 1994, said "f... the toothless ALija Izetbegović. He's fighting to get Sandžak and he is incapable of resolving the problems within Bosnia and Herzegovina." Those who were present when the Municipal President stated that were Habib Dautović and Daut Dautović from Šubin and Alija from Lasovac. On one occasion, in July 1994, there was talk of how President Izetbegović was to come to Srebrenica. They even placed a large banner above the street which said "welcome". Since the visit never happened, the Chief of Engineering in the 8th OG, Mirsad Dudić, took a man called Alaga Tihić, the doorman from the Department Store who usually served for making a circus in Srebrenica, dressed him in a suit, put a tie on him, and led him through the town saying, "This is Alija Izetbegović and I am Rasim Delić." No one from the MUP or the military police reacted to that. I do not know whether that was on the radio, but there was talk in Srebrenica of how President Izetbegović had said on one occasion that we did not need a state if it would be governed the way it was governed in Srebrenica and Zenica. That was a reference to the increased crime in the two towns. The then [?Municipal] President, now the Municipal Mayor, Salihović Fahrudin, reacted to that, "Alija is full of c... We defended this. If he would only come, so I could tell him what I meant." Džemal Mašić, the then President of Bratunac Municipality, was present during that. As a matter of fact, Džemal was a great SDA sympathiser and that was very hard on him, and he told everyone what he had heard from the Municipal Mayor Fahrudin. Sometime in May or June 1993, the Municipal President was Fahrudin Avdić who was, in fact, one of Zulfo's men from Sućeska, and I know he was an honest man from the time when he was my director, and he

³⁰ t/n: Local Community

remained such later as the Municipal President. He did not answer to Naser Orić because, I assume, he did not want to back up Naser's criminal actions. Since at the time I was a Commandant of the

[signature: Salihović Huso]

[Beginning of the 8th page of original text.]

Skenderovići Individual Battalion [illegible] War Presidency Fahrudin Alić, who was assigned from my area, and Naser asked me to influence Alić to vote for the replacement of President Fahrudin Avdić so he could appoint Fahrudin Salihović, known as Adem, to that post. I refused to talk about it, given that I am not interested in civilian authority structures. Naser exerted such pressures on other Commandants as well and in that manner he succeeded to replace the then President Avdić and to appoint Fahrudin Salihović. That is when serious disagreements occurred between Naser and Zulfo Tursunović. Since at the time Zulfo and I were in a good relationship, Zulfo told me of how Naser had charged some men with Zulfo's liquidation. After the earlier President was replaced and the new one appointed, Naser Orić, in his flat in the presence of Behaija Ajkanović (who was Naser's man, as a matter of fact) and Fahrudin Alić, shouted on multiple occasions while in a euphoric state, "We did it, we did it.

Now the marks³¹ will flow straight into the pocket." **02966942**

Even though the work of the SDA was banned, in late 1993, that party's activists led by MP Ibran Mustafić called up the activists of the party to hold a meeting in the premises of Srebrenica OŠ. About 60 members gathered there and they wanted to enter the school to hold the meeting, but the Srebrenica police came and dispersed those people. That is when Ibran openly told the police, "Here, feel free to arrest me, but report to Sarajevo about my arrest and why I was arrested." The school principal, Jusuf Bektić, was not present there even though he was a member of the SDA IO, but given his function he stayed somewhat away from that activity. Besides - and he told me this personally in the presence of Ahmo Tihić - a few days later after that event, Naser Orić kidnapped him and drove him by a car out of town where he was supposed to kill him. Naser then told him, "Zulfo beats and I kill." However, some woman came across them who saw Naser with him, and they released him with a warning that he would be done if he told anyone about that.

I was told by Ibran that in May 1993 his house had been shot at from an RPG³². However, they shot the apple [tree] in front of his window and he was lucky it was not a direct shot. He told me that "Naserovci" Semir and Čare from Potočari did it. I know very well that in the entire territory of Srebrenica there were only two RPGs,

³¹ t/n: Deutsche Marks - currency

³² t/n: anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade

and they were both at the Main Staff, while only one of them was functional and only Commandant Naser or NŠ Ramiz could have authorised its use.

I met with the people from the party when they came to Srebrenica, given that they were all from Potočari. Around 19 May 1995, they came to Srebrenica for a gathering at Ahmo Thić where I too was present. Besides Tihic and I, Hamed Efendić, Ibrahim Mustafić, Hamed Salihović, Fahrudin Alić, Jusuf Imširović, Ejub Delić, and Mustafa Ibišević were also present at the gathering. I must point out that it was no official meeting but instead we just talked about many various things. We sat there until 2200 hours, and from there we each headed to our own house. The three of them, Ibran and the two men both called Hamed, headed to Potočari. At about 0130 [hours] that night, I was woken up by Fahrudin Alić, Fehim Hasanović, and Ibro Jakubović, and they told me to get ready and to come outside. Outside, Fahrudin Alić told me that there was an ambush and that Ibran was wounded and that both men called Hamed were killed. We went to wake up Ahmo Tihic and we went to the medical emergency service, at the entrance of which we saw the UNPROFOR men with our doctors; Ibro was on the [operating] table and Hamed Efendić who was unhurt was beside him. Hamed Efendić told us that Hamed Salihović was dead and that it happened near the training ground in Potočari. From there we took Ibran to the operating room, where I stayed with Jakubović in order to guard Ibran, and Fahrudin Alić went with the others to the crime scene.

Some indicative findings that I and my above-named friends learned about the potential perpetrators of the ambush or the persons who should know [something] about it are the following: On his way back from the gathering that night, Fahrudin Alić stopped by the Ljepotica³³ tavern that was ran by Alić and Edhem Hasanović. Besides Edhem, in the tavern he ran into Bekir Barak who was there as a guest. That entire night Barak was the single guest at the tavern and was keeping the owners from going home until 0115 hours. Barak, who was in a half-drunk state, told Edhem multiple times, "I have some things to tell you but I can't; you're not alone." Given that Barak is a Naserovac, we thought he was suspicious, and that he knew something about that event or that it was his task to keep Alić and Edhem [there], and after that he did not come to the tavern anymore and he ~~kept~~ [handwritten: avoided] the two men. Ibran later told me that while they were moving towards Potočari, at one place about 400 m away from the crime scene, they were illuminated by a flashlight and Hamed Efendić said [to that someone] to turn off the flashlight, and in the meanwhile, in close proximity, some woman came out a house

[signature: Salihović Huso]

³³ t/n: literal translation is *The Beauty*

[Beginning of the 9th page of original text.]

carrying a lantern and [illegible] that that was the reason for the ambush not be carried out there. After that, [?they] kept moving and when they heard that someone was going behind them, Hamed Efendić turned around and said, "We are being followed, run." At that moment, those persons (three of them) opened fire. Hamed Efendić turned left into one forest and the other two headed right and Ibran told me that, after he had been shot, he called for help and that he was then approached by one of the attackers who tried to finish him with a rifle from a distance of half a meter, and that is when a bullet went through his cheek under his eye. Ibran then lay low and later he crawled to the nearest house and asked for help. Hamed Efendić was on the right in the forest and he waited there until UNPROFOR came. For safety reasons, Ibran's uncle³⁴ Hazim Mustafić came to pick up Ibran to take him from the hospital and Ahmo Tihić was with them in the car. While he was driving him through the town towards Potočari, next to the Department Store, Ibran inertly pointed his finger at one person who was in the street and said, "That is the killer." The person whom Ibran pointed his finger at was Šaćir from Konjević Polje, a well known "Naserovac", as a matter of fact. No one but me, Ibran's uncle, and Hamed knows of that Ibran's reaction. That person is characteristic because he had been anonymous among the "Naserovci", and after that event everything revolved around him. He was mainly in charge of everything among those people. Besides this person, another characteristic person is Šećir's cousin Refko who was seen in town carrying an M-72 PM that night at about 0200 hours, and he ran into a warehouse worker from Klisa called Jahić, who was from the village of Stožerska and who lives in Srebrenica. He grabbed Jahić by the shoulder and shook him, and the man told him, "What's wrong with you, Refko? It's me, we know each other." And then Refko responded to him, "Watch out, you never saw me." And the third person who is suspicious to me is Ćelo from Glogova in Bratunac municipality. He often, before that, publically spoke of how he would kill Ahmo Tihić and his friends, and after that event he was often seen in taverns spending money, and it is well known that he had not had money before. **02966943**

As for the money that arrived to the dKoV from the Republic, I heard that Nedžad Bektić in September 1995[handwritten: 3] brought DM 100,000 from Sarajevo and handed that over to Commandant Naser, and Naser never informed us commandants or the army of the arrival of that money, and I am not familiar with the fact that that money was put to a good use. I know that Ramiz Bećirević brought a larger amount of money when the helicopter crashed, and he himself said that he would distribute salaries to the army, which he did not do, and I do not know if he distributed it to anyone else, given that I was not

³⁴ t/n: his father's brother

in the army at that time. I know that Ramiz personally, before Srebrenica fell, in the evening of 9 July 1995, held a meeting with the army and promised that he would give each soldier that participated in the operation DM 200, and that those who destroyed a tank would be given DM 10,000. The operation was carried out in the morning of 10 July 1995, and it was mainly successful. However, no one got the money and as far as I know, the surviving fighters are requesting that money to this day.

As for the relationship between the civilian and military authorities and the UNPROFOR in Srebrenica, I do not know anything particular about it. I only know that bread was baked for the UNPROFOR and that the UNPROFOR was paying DM 4,000 per month to the municipality for those services.

As for the cause for Srebrenica's fall, I was not directly involved in anything because I was not a member of the Army at the time, but I do know for sure that 7 days before the Chetnik offensive which started on 5 July 1995, the UNPROFOR received an ultimatum from the Chetniks to withdraw from the post in Zeleni Jadar. That is when the UNPROFOR held a meeting with our military authorities and they agreed that our soldiers could simultaneously keep guards with the UNPROFOR at the post in Zeleni Jadar. From then onwards, our army was allowed to carry weapons normally even in the town itself. As far as I know, our men formed a well-organised line behind the post in Zeleni Jadar. I told some of our officer staff that it was unwise that the army was openly carrying weapons because we were still a demilitarised zone, and that they should hide them because the UNPROFOR would record how much of what do we possess and would forward that [information] to the Chetniks. Right before the very offensive, the Chetniks took the UNPROFOR post in Zeleni Jadar without a problem, and after the UNPROFOR withdrew, our fighters from the newly-formed line did as well. As early as in the morning of 6 July 1995, the Chetniks attacked the Biljeg elevation point the hardest where the UNPROFOR was stationed, and right behind it was out line. UNPROFOR offered symbolic resistance (there was some shooting from a PAM³⁵) and the very next day, on 7 July 1995, Biljeg fell and the UNPROFOR surrendered there while our fighters withdrew to Ljubisavići. When I saw that the Chetniks were advancing towards the town, I went to the Debelo Brdo line with about 15 fighters and at that part of the line and at that [time] I ran into the Commandant

[signature: Salihović Huso]

[Beginning of the 10th page of original text.]

of the [282nd] Brigade, [Ibro Dudić], [with about ten fighters]. I do not think that there were any other fighters, despite the fact that that was

³⁵ t/n: anti-aircraft machine gun

the main axis of advance for the Chetniks. We spent the entire night fortifying, and in the morning came couriers and informed us that the operation was about to commence. And that is what happened. Some fighters came and the operation commenced early in the morning. That same day in that same part, the Chetniks were pushed back close to Ljubisavići. In my group, Commander of IDV³⁶ Ibro Jakubović was wounded. I carried him down to the brook so he could bandage [his wound] and there Ejub Golić's brother told me that an order had been issued for us to withdraw. I started yelling and asked who had ordered that since we were so close to Ljubisavići, 20 m away from the asphalt [road]. Then I saw that the fighters from other positions were withdrawing to the brook as well. Since I was no one's superior, there was nothing I could have done, so I alongside a few other fighters transported that wounded man to the medical emergency service. One kilometre lower from that place, I saw Ekrem Salihović from the Division Command and IO President Hamdija Fejzić withdrawing with the remaining army. A car came to pick up my wounded casualty and I went to the hospital with him. That day, in the evening around 1700 hours on 10 July 1995, I noticed that masses of people were heading towards the UNPROFOR [which was] at the exit of the town in the direction of Potočari. The people were shouting in panic that the Chetniks were descending into town. I went to [my] flat, took a rifle, and headed towards the periphery of the town (Petriča). I have noticed our troops in the town, and they were in disorder. While we were moving, I was calling the troops so we could consolidate. Some of them even headed. When I got to the periphery, only Ramo Hljebara³⁷ was with me. The Chetniks had not yet descended into town. I tried to have us consolidate the defence in the town itself, and in the town centre I ran into Municipal Mayor and IO President with whom I went to the people and we asked the people to go back to their flats. I told the people that I had just come from Petriča and that there were no Chetniks in town. People started returning in masses. However, the Chetniks then started intensely shelling and the people again went to the UNPROFOR. I asked the IO President to see what was happening with the troops and to have them place guards around the town. I know for a fact that no one from the civilian or the military authorities spoke to the people or gave them any sort of instructions. The next day, at about 1100 hours on 11 July 1995, the Chetniks started descending into town. I was at the town centre with a group of 20 people until 1200 hours, and from there we moved towards the town exit and turned left over Kutlići towards Sućeska, and the people were heading towards Potočari.

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Before Sućeska, we heard that the assembly place was in Šušnjari and we arrived there at about 2300 or 2400 hours. All fighters and all

³⁶ t/n: Reconnaissance and Sabotage Platoon

³⁷ t/n: literal translation of the nickname is *bread maker*

able-bodied civilians gathered there, and in my estimate there was about 12 to 15 thousand [people]. There Ahmo Tihić and I searched for Ibran and Hamed Efendić, and someone told us that they did not dare to set off and that they had surrendered to the UNPROFOR. The army was lined up by brigades there, and from there we headed before the dawn, considering that my group was among the last ones in the column. As far as I know, the unit commandants were given some instructions and a schedule for setting off. I know that it was said at the beginning that the killed were to be left behind and that the wounded must be carried. Right in front of the Chetnik lines on Buljim there was a great crowd because we were told that the area was mined, and we waited a long time to join the column because people were moving one by one. While moving across Buljim, somewhere behind my back, about 500 m away, I heard detonations. Later I heard that it was a Chetnik ambush, and the Chetniks fired from zoljas³⁸ and RBs³⁹ at the column. The column stopped somewhere close to the exit from Buljim and the entrance to Kamenica, and a large number of people gathered there where they waited for the night to come in order to cross the asphalt [road] that led to Konjević Polje. An hour and half before nightfall, the brigades started lining up and it became crowded there. A bigger part of the armed troops was allowed to go, and mainly unarmed troops and civilians were left. We were told that they were leaving to secure a free passage across the asphalt [road] in Kaldrmica. A number of the remaining men lined up in a column by two, while the others had not even been lined up when the Chetniks started firing from all sides. That it when panic and chaos arose and the people separated looking for cover, and the night had already fallen. I joined one group that randomly headed towards Konjević Polje, and a lot of the people stayed in the woods and meadows, not knowing where to go while the Chetniks were showering the people with heavy fire. When we came down to right in front of Kaldrmica, there I saw Municipal President Osman Suljić who was asking the people whether anyone knew where Kaldrmica was. I alongside about ten fighters descended down to the brook and we went downstream to look for a passage, but we promised that group that we would come back for them. We ran into some bridge. We could not go left because we could hear a Chetnik personnel carrier from that direction. We returned upstream and ran into an overpass from which

[signature: Salihović Huso]

[Beginning of the 11th page of original text.]

the Chetniks opened fire at us and dispersed us, and perhaps some of us even died. I found myself alone in the brook and before the dawn I returned up to the group that had been waiting for us. A larger

³⁸ t/n: rocket-propelled grenade launcher

³⁹ t/n: bazooka

number people, when they saw that they could not pass through and that the day had already dawned, returned to Kamenica. In my estimate, that was a group of about 500 people, mainly civilians. There we discussed about what was to be done, whether to negotiate with the Chetniks, and so on. I said that I would be going back into the forest and about 15 people joined me. While we were going back, I saw three of our men commit suicide. My group and I were in one forest on an axis between Konjević Polje and Nova Kasaba and from above there we could see when the Chetniks used megaphones to ask out people to surrender, telling them that they would not hurt them and promising them various things. Even buses started arriving. From there we did not see the place where people were surrendering; we only saw, while we were moving towards Nova Kasaba, one group of 50 people with their hands on the back of their heads being chased by the Chetniks. In our group, of the people I know, were Ibran Planić from Potočari, Mesud Planić. Mustafa Biđević, Meho from the village of Kozmanovići, and so on - a total of 15 of us. From there we moved to the village of Jelah and we stayed there for three days. Each day we tried to cross the asphalt [road] but we did not dare do it because the Chetniks were everywhere. On the fourth day, we returned to the village of Kamenice and there we found at least about 1,500 people. There I found some people from Sućeska who told me that they knew the way to Sućeska, and the next morning at about 0400 hours, 42 of us headed towards Sućeska. I was the undesignated leader of the group that had some men who knew the way to Sućeska. Besides the above-named acquaintances, Ejub from Sebiočina, Hajrudin from Močevići [sic], who was wounded, and the PK for personal affairs from the 281st Brigade were also in the group. We came to Sućeska within 48 hours, and there we found some groups that had arrived prior to us. That day we rested in Sućeska and in the early evening we headed to Žepa across Podravanje. On the way there some groups caught up with us, while we caught up with some [other groups], so in the morning about 120 of us came to the free territory of Žepa.

It should be noted that when we were below Sebiočina, the hill opposite Kamenica, we saw a mass of corpses of our people that were killed. In Žepa we rested for 2 or 3 days and then I got a call from Ramo Čardaković, the NŠ of the 285th Brigade, who told me that if there were men who had arrived there earlier and recuperated, they were to be sent to the line. 120 men immediately volunteered and they were sent to the line. However, in my opinion, the Command of the 285th Brigade was unfair because they were sending those men to the hardest positions where the attacks were most intense, and [then] those men started leaving those positions and the line and were going to the less difficult parts of the line. **02966943**

7 days later, Žepa fell and about 20 people and I were in the rocks of Crni Potok. From there we were observing and we saw our fighters transport themselves to Serbia on a raft, and they had left their weapons next to the Drina [river] and some of them threw them in the

Drina. According to my estimate, at least 1,500 people surrendered to Serbia, considering that we were watching that for three days, and some of our people went down there to get the weapons that were next to the Drina. I heard from the people in Žepa that NŠ Ramo Čardaklija had told his fighters that he too would come to that place to surrender to Serbia. Later I found out that Ramo never surrendered.

The 24 of us headed from the rocks for a breakthrough towards Kladanj. We had no problems until Slivanj, where we ran into a Chetnik line and where our own dog gave us out. We dispersed into two groups there. One group of about 10 fighters crossed over to Slivanj that night, and I, in a group of 14 fighters, crossed over to Sokolin the following day.

I have nothing else to state about the aforementioned; I claim that what I had stated is true, and append my personal signature to it.

STATEMENT GIVEN BY:

[signature: Salihović Huso]

/Huso Salihović/

STATEMENT TAKEN BY:

[no entry]

/Salih Terzić/